The Sudanese State in Care

Is the Sudanese state in intensive care?

If the statement attributed to Minni Arko Minnawi is true – that armed movements will continue to be present in the north, east and centre, and that for those who feel constrained, the Arqin crossing is nearby – then this is not merely a passing remark, but rather reveals a genuine crisis in the very concept of the Sudanese state.

Manawi is no ordinary citizen; he is the governor of the Darfur region and the leader of an armed movement, and his forces form part of the Joint Force. The Sudanese people are therefore entitled to ask:

Where were Manawi and the armed groups when the war broke out between the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces?

Why did they initially stand by and watch the situation unfold, waiting to see which side would gain the upper hand? Then, when the balance of power began to shift in favour of the armed forces, why did the armed groups emerge and side with the army?

This is a legitimate question, and it does not detract from anyone’s right to hold their own view.

However, the greatest danger today is that this military alliance might develop into a permanent arrangement of armed spheres of influence.

If the movements are fighting alongside the army in defence of Sudan, then their place is on the front lines where the state needs them – in Darfur, Kordofan and every region of Sudan facing a threat – and not in the north, east and centre to secure an independent military presence.

And if the reason for keeping these forces is the fear that the army might betray them, then the truth becomes clear:

This is not an alliance based on trust, but rather an alliance of interests brought about by war; each side needs the other, but does not fully trust it.

And this brings us to the root of the problem:

Does anyone who possesses an armed force now consider themselves a state?

Does owning a gun now give its owner the right to say to a Sudanese person: ‘If our presence here is getting on your nerves, the Arqin crossing is nearby’?

No, Manawi. Sudan does not belong to the armed movements, nor are the north, the east or the centre exclusive spheres of influence for any one group.

The Sudanese state may be weak and ailing today, and it may indeed be in intensive care, but it is not dead.

It is our duty to revive it, build its institutions, restore its prestige, place all arms under the authority of the state, and establish a single national army and a single national leadership.

Neither Manawi nor al-Burhan, nor any armed leader, represents the state.

The country is Sudan.

Anyone who believes that the weakness of the state gives them the right to act above it must realise that states may fall ill, but they do not die.

The day will come when the Sudanese state regains its strength and stands on its own two feet; and when that happens, there will be no place in Sudan for anyone who places their gun above the state, or who believes that their armed forces grant them a private fiefdom within the nation.

Mohammed Sharia
From the struggle for power to nation-building.