Criminal liability for the Rapid Support Forces

Why won’t the «Kizan» take responsibility for the consequences of the crime of creating the Rapid Support Forces?

Responsibility is not measured by who fired the first shot, but by who built the system that made it possible

The question of responsibility has remained a central theme in the Sudanese debate since the outbreak of the war on 15 April 2023:

Who bears responsibility for the disaster caused by the Rapid Support Forces?

The fair answer cannot be: «Rapid Support alone».

Nor can it be: «the army alone».

Nor should the response be allowed to become a political exoneration of the Salvation Regime, the Islamic Front and the National Congress Party, which ruled Sudan for three decades, during which they reshaped the state, the army, the security apparatus and society in a way that contributed to creating the environment from which one of the most dangerous armed groups in Sudan’s modern history emerged.

The Rapid Support Forces bear responsibility for the crimes they have committed, just as their commanders and fighters bear responsibility for their actions, each according to their role.

However, that does not rule out another, more profound question:

Who created the political, security and legal conditions that allowed a military force parallel to the state to emerge, and then provided it with weapons, legitimacy, resources and influence?

This is where the rescue service’s responsibility begins.

Firstly: The crime of overthrowing democracy

The problem stemmed from its political origins.

In June 1989, Omar al-Bashir, with the support of the National Islamic Front, overthrew the existing democratic system. Political and trade union organisations were dissolved, and the state was restructured in accordance with an authoritarian, ideologically driven project.

This was not merely a change of government; it was, without a doubt, a setback for the democratic development of the Sudanese state.

For when political institutions are shut down, political parties and trade unions are suppressed, and the state becomes subservient to a single party or organisation, society loses the means to manage disputes peacefully.

Rather than being a contest of political programmes, the political conflict is gradually turning into a struggle for control of the state.

And this is where the roots of the disaster lie.

Secondly: The politicisation of the state and the weakening of its institutions

Making political loyalty a fundamental criterion in the running of the state was one of the greatest mistakes of the Salvation Regime.

Large numbers of civil servants, military personnel and professionals were dismissed and replaced by regime loyalists.

In many sectors, state institutions have become tied to a system of political and security loyalty.

And this is where a highly dangerous shift took place:

The state has begun to lose its neutrality, institutions are losing their independence, and the party has come to take precedence over the institutions.

This is not merely a moral issue, but a matter of national security.

A state whose institutions are not stronger than individuals and organisations is unable to maintain a stable monopoly on power.

Thirdly: Turning war into a means of managing politics

In the south, and subsequently in Darfur and other regions, the regime did not treat the war as a political failure that needed to be brought to an end, but instead relied extensively on the militarisation of society and the use of armed groups loyal to the state.

Studies suggest that the Bashir regime utilised paramilitary forces and the Popular Defence Forces, and that the Janjaweed, who were supported by the government in Darfur, formed part of the environment from which the Rapid Support Forces subsequently emerged.

At this point, we should pause to consider a fundamental fact:

When a state employs militias outside the traditional structure of the armed forces, it opens a door that is difficult to close.

For a force established to fight today’s adversary may become an adversary of the state tomorrow.

Fourth: The rapid support industry

This is the clearest aspect of historical responsibility.

The Rapid Support Forces were not an independent popular movement that emerged out of nowhere.

It was officially established in 2013 during the reign of Omar al-Bashir, and was initially under the control of the Security and Intelligence Service, whilst its roots lie with the Janjaweed, whom the al-Bashir government deployed in the Darfur war.

So, the question is not:

Was the Rapid Support Forces in existence before the war?

Yes.

Rather, the real question is:

Who set it up? Why? Under whose auspices? And who provided it with weapons, money and power?

These questions cannot be answered by placing the blame solely on Hamidti.

Fahmidati did not invent the system through which he rose to power; rather, he rose within a system established by the regime itself.

Fifth: The biggest mistake — establishing an army parallel to the regular army

The modern state is based on a simple principle:

The state’s armed forces must be under the command of the state.

There cannot be two independent armies within a state, each with its own command structure, resources, networks of interests and spheres of influence.

But Bashir’s regime did the opposite.

Instead of building a unified national military institution, he allowed parallel armed forces to develop.

More seriously, the Rapid Support Forces have not remained merely an auxiliary force, but have gradually transformed into a military, economic and political institution with independent influence.

By the final years of al-Bashir’s rule, the Rapid Support Forces had become a key player within the power structure.

This is not Hamidti’s responsibility alone, but that of whoever originally decided to make the state rely on military force outside the traditional structure of the army.

Sixth: Using rapid support to protect the system

The great historical irony is that the regime that created this force did not even have complete confidence in traditional state institutions.

Al-Bashir’s regime was based on the distribution of power amongst various agencies and institutions, so that no single institution could bring down the regime.

Researchers have described this approach as a form of «protection against coups», achieved by establishing rival security and military forces.

And this is where the regime made a fatal strategic mistake:

Protecting the regime has become more important than nation-building.

And when a ruler’s priority is to protect the regime rather than the state, the state’s own institutions begin to be transformed into instruments of conflict.

Seventh: The Darfur crime and the state’s responsibility for the creation of militias

The issue of the Rapid Support Forces cannot be separated from Darfur.

The Janjaweed have been associated with the war in Darfur and the widespread abuses that took place there; subsequently, part of this armed group was reorganised under the name Rapid Support Forces.

Therefore, to describe Rapid Support as a «problem that began on 15 April 2023» is a misleading oversimplification of history.

The problem goes back much further.

It began when tribal and militia forces became one of the state’s instruments for waging war and conducting politics.

The International Criminal Court has also issued arrest warrants for Omar al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in connection with Darfur.

These are not merely political accusations levelled by his opponents, but a case that has reached an international judicial body.

Eighth: The division of society and the emergence of the ‘deep state’

One of the most serious consequences of three decades of Salvation rule is that the state is no longer merely a collection of public institutions.

Political, economic and security networks linked to the regime have emerged, and the state has become an arena for conflict between interest groups.

This has led to a weakening of the concept of citizenship.

Instead of citizens being equal before the state, political, regional or security affiliations have become a route to influence and resources.

This brings us to one of the most serious consequences of the system:

Weakening the nation state in favour of power networks.

Ninth: The informal economy

The rescue operation was not merely a political issue.

During the years of his rule, economic networks linked to the security and military apparatus and the ruling party emerged.

This has led to the emergence of an economy that is not fully subject to civil oversight or to conventional financial institutions.

As a result, some military forces came to have their own resources and were no longer entirely dependent on the state budget.

This is an extremely serious issue in any country; for an army or a militia that has its own independent economy becomes less accountable to the civilian authorities.

Tenth: Separation from South Sudan

The rescue operation alone cannot be held responsible for all the causes of South Sudan’s secession; the issue has historical roots dating back further than 1989.

However, it cannot be ignored that the regime waged the war in the south with a hardline military and ideological mindset, and that the protracted war ended with a comprehensive peace agreement and the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

And here the question must be asked:

Has the regime preserved Sudan’s unity?

This historic outcome indicates that Sudan lost a significant portion of its territory, population and resources, and that the state emerged from this experience in a weakened state.

Eleventh: Thirty years without building a democratic state

The most serious thing the regime did was that, following its downfall, it did not leave behind a stable, democratic state.

In fact, he left:

A massive army with multiple centres of power.

Robust security measures.

Parallel armed groups.

A military and security economy.

Weak political institutions.

Exhausted parties.

A divided society.

A series of regional crises.

A political culture that regards power as a means to authority.

And this is the environment that came to a head after 2019.

XII: After Bashir’s fall — a missed opportunity

This is where the responsibility of other parties begins.

It is wrong to blame the Keizan alone for everything that has happened since 2019.

Following Bashir’s downfall, the Sudanese people were presented with a historic opportunity to build a civilian state and restructure the security and military sectors.

However, the move fell through.

Then came the October 2021 coup, in which both the army and the Rapid Support Forces played a part in the military action that derailed the democratic transition.

The crisis thus shifted from the question:

Who rules Sudan?

In response to the question:

Who owns the weapon?

Then, on 15 April 2023, the conflict broke out.

Thirteenth: But were the Kizans the only ones at fault?

We need to be fairer here.

No.

The current war is not the sole responsibility of the Kizans.

The Rapid Support Forces bear direct responsibility for the crimes they have committed.

Furthermore, the military and political leaders who made decisions following Bashir’s fall must bear responsibility, as must the civilian political forces for their mistakes, and the regional and international states that supported the warring parties.

However, the question we are discussing here is not:

Who committed all the war crimes?

Rather:

Who laid the structural foundations that made the existence of a parallel military force possible?

And the historical answer is clear:

The rescue system is responsible for establishing this model.

14: Why do some Keizans refuse to acknowledge this responsibility?

Because admitting a mistake would mean acknowledging that their political project has failed not only in economic and political terms, but also in the state’s most vital function: protecting the state from collapse.

Those who say:

«It was the Rapid Support Forces who started the war; we have nothing to do with it»

They overlook the fact that the Rapid Support Forces were not a foreign force that dropped in from the sky.

It came into being within the Sudanese state, by a decision of the Sudanese authorities, during the era of the Salvation regime, pursuant to laws enacted during that period, and under the leadership of an authority headed by Omar al-Bashir.

It subsequently developed into an independent force.

15. However, acknowledging responsibility does not mean exonerating the Rapid Support Forces

This is a point that must be made clear.

To say that the rescue regime bears historical responsibility for the creation of Rapid Support does not in any way absolve Rapid Support of responsibility for its crimes.

Mistakes made during rescue operations must not be used to justify the crimes committed by the Rapid Support Forces.

Nor should the crimes of the Rapid Support Forces be used to exonerate the Rescue Movement from responsibility for the environment that gave rise to it.

The two offences do not negate one another.

In fact, understanding the former helps one to understand the latter.

Summary

The Sudanese crisis did not begin on 15 April 2023.

That date marked the moment the crisis erupted; however, the roots of the crisis lie in decades of state governance based on the logic of force, the politicisation of institutions, the militarisation of society, the creation of parallel armed forces, and the weakening of civilian politics.

Rapid Support is one of the most dangerous products of this system.

Therefore, the correct national stance is not to say:

«It’s all the Kezans» fault.’.

Nor is it a matter of saying:

«The Al-Kizan have nothing to do with the Rapid Support Forces.».

In fact, the correct position is:

The Kizan bear direct historical and political responsibility for creating the environment that gave rise to the Rapid Support Forces, as well as for establishing the force itself during al-Bashir’s rule, expanding its role, and transforming it into a parallel armed institution.

As for the crimes subsequently committed by the Rapid Support Forces, the responsibility for these lies with their commanders and the perpetrators; they are not subject to a political statute of limitations, nor are they justified by the mistakes of the previous regime.

And the most important lesson Sudan needs to learn is:

There can be no state without a single national army, no national army without a civilian state, no democracy that can endure in the presence of armed militias, and no genuine peace without justice and accountability for all those who have committed crimes, regardless of their position or political affiliation.

Sudan has paid the price for turning the state into a power project.

The path to the future does not lie in reproducing the same model under new names, but in building a single state, a single army, a single law, a single citizenship, and an authority that derives its legitimacy from the people, not from the barrel of a gun.